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Even though high penalties for corruption offences have a deterrent 
and preventive effect, they also entrap bribe-takers and bribe-givers 
in their corrupt relationship. Moreover, pending penalties can be 
misused to make threats against opportunistic behavior and can thus 
stabilize risky bribe agreements. This paper shows how voluntary 
disclosure programs can be strategically applied to break the ‘pact of 
silence’ and to promote opportunism in a targeted way. Against this 
background the paper studies the leniency provisions in the penal 
codes of 56 countries. The analysis reveals deficiencies in the 
utilization and in the design of voluntary disclosure programs for 
corruption offences. 
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1  Introduction 
Until the 1970s corruption was a topic hardly discussed. In fact, it is only since the 1990s that 
the anti-corruption movement has gained significant momentum, spurred by myriad media 
reports, articles and scientific studies from different disciplines all showing the detrimental 
effects of corruption. A vast number of researchers as well as of practitioners all over the 
world have concentrated their intellectual efforts on unearthing the causes and consequences 
of corruption, on analyzing the mechanisms of corruption as well as on devising the means to 
fight it. Our knowledge on corruption and anti-corruption is thus increasing at a remarkable 
speed. And as reform ideas are tested throughout the world and experiences are rapidly and 
broadly exchanged, significant steps in establishing good practices have been made. 
Most attempts towards curbing corruption entail repressive and preventive measures as well 
as the fostering of transparency. However, these avenues towards anti-corruption have 
various serious limitations, (Lambsdorff and Nell 2006). Given these drawbacks, novel 
approaches towards fighting corruption have been explored. Concepts of the new 
institutional economics, for instance, posit that reform measures should promote betrayal 
among corrupt parties, destabilize corrupt arrangements, disallow immoral contracts to be 
legally enforced, and impair the operation of corrupt intermediaries, (Lambsdorff, Schramm 
and Taube 2005; Lambsdorff 2007). Moreover, representatives of industrial organization 
economics and game theory have recently shed light on new ways of tackling corruption, 
also including the optimal design and implementation of leniency programs. For a review of 
the relevant literature see for instance Gneuß (2002), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2005, 2006) 
and Spagnolo (2006). 
Offering captured wrongdoers lenient treatment in exchange for information valuable to 
investigation and prosecution has been a standard tool for centuries. Plea bargains, for 
example, have for a long time been an important element of investigation and prosecution. 
They entail an agreement in which the detected and indicted person agrees to plead guilty or 
no contest, and in some cases also agrees to provide testimony against another person. In 
return the person is promised by a prosecutor a mitigated punishment or is charged with a 
lesser crime. Accordingly, plea bargains are applied at the time an offender is detected. 
Voluntary disclosure programs differ from plea bargains and similar post-detection 
exchanges in two important aspects. First, they are directed at wrongdoers who have not yet 
been exposed. In Germany, for instance, a tax evader is exempted from criminal proceedings 
if he turns himself in prior to detection. Similarly, a voluntary disclosure program for 
corruption offences grants leniency if a bribe-taker or bribe-giver self-reports his offence 
before detection. Active repentance, expressed by the act of self-reporting, is thus the 
primary circumstance removing criminal liability. In contrast, a plea bargain is struck to 
reduce the costs of prosecution and conviction and sometimes to obtain evidence against 
other offenders. Active repentance does not play a crucial role. 
Second, voluntary disclosure programs grant a reduction in the applicable penalty not on a 
case by case, crime by crime basis. Rather, leniency is conceded to anybody who is in a 
certain codified situation and meets the conditions that the program sets, (Spagnolo 2006: 7). 
Leniency is thus universal and automatic. The reduction in the penalty is definitely bestowed 
and not subject to discretion by prosecutors or judges, as in a plea bargain. 
For three primary reasons voluntary disclosure programs may prove to be more adequate for 
fighting corruption than post-detection exchanges such as plea bargains, (Lambsdorff and  
      - 2 -
Nell 2007: 8). First, voluntary disclosure programs codify the extent of leniency and thus 
reduce legal uncertainty. Consequently, they give wrongdoers an ‘exit option’ that they can 
definitely rely on and thus promote self-reporting. The same does not hold true for plea 
bargains since their credibility and reliability may succumb to prosecutors’ and judges’ 
discretion. 
This is corroborated by a recent case involving German soccer referee Robert Hoyzer. After 
having been detected in 2005 and indicted for fixing soccer games, Hoyzer struck a plea 
bargain with the prosecuting authorities and provided testimony against some members of 
the German-Croatian gambling mafia. However, the judge sentenced Hoyzer to a higher 
prison term than the prosecution in fact had asked for in its final plea.
1 
Second, prosecutors and judges might themselves be susceptible to misusing their 
discretionary powers for private benefit. In the worst case this would increase corruption also 
in the judicial system.
2 Voluntary disclosure programs, however, significantly strip judges 
and prosecutors of their discretionary powers and therefore also of the possibility to 
administer justice corruptly. Third, voluntary disclosure programs can be designed such to 
reflect the unique nature of corrupt deals and to exploit their Achilles heel. 
Corrupt deals are afflicted with several risks. Corruption requires cooperation among several 
agents to perform the illegal activity. The prerequisite of cooperation in turn implies a 
governance problem, (Spagnolo 2006: 4). In particular, corrupt crooks have to fear that they 
will be cheated by their counterparts. For instance, a firm bribing a public official to be 
awarded a lucrative contract may in the end see the official awarding the contract to a 
competitor. Similarly, the public official may be cheated by the firm. After he awarded the 
contract the firm rejects payment, (Lambsdorff and Nell 2007). 
That corrupt actors oftentimes do not get what they were promised is corroborated by a 
recent case involving German-Canadian lobbyist Karlheinz Schreiber. In 1993 and 1994 
Schreiber, who is still fighting his extradition from Canada to Germany, where he faces tax 
evasion, bribery and fraud charges, paid CAD 300,000 to former Canadian Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney. In March 2003 Schreiber sued Mulroney, alleging that he failed to provide 
any services for the CAD 300,000 he was paid. Schreiber said that he hired Mulroney to help 
establish a Quebec factory to build light-armored vehicles for German behemoth Thyssen 
AG but that Mulroney failed to advance the project. Moreover, Schreiber claimed that 
Mulroney "further defaulted on his promise" to promote his pasta business, Reto Restaurant 
Systems International. In July 2007 the Superior Court in Ontario acceded to Schreiber’s 
claim and ordered Mulroney to pay Schreiber CAD 470,000 (300,000 plus interest) since he 
did not meet the time limit for filing an objection.
3 
Normally, however, corrupt actors cannot solve their disputes through courts or arbitration 
councils since they have to fear criminal proceedings. Thus, they have to look for alternative 
                                                 
1 See Pressemitteilung des BGH Nr. 174/2006, http://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/pm/2006/174-2006.html, 
download on 26 November 2007. 
2 For a comprehensive review of corruption in judicial systems see Global Corruption Report (2007). 
3 See Welt Online (28 July 2007: “Schreiber bekommt Schmiergeld zurück”), http://www.welt.de/welt_print/ 
article1061283/Schreiber_bekommt_Schmiergeld_zurck.html, download on 27 November 2007; CityNews (14 
November 2007: “Brian Mulroney, Karlheinz Schreiber Case Chronology”), http://www.citynews.ca/ 
news/news_16761.aspx, download on 27 November 2007.  
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mechanisms to avoid opportunism and to enforce their deals. For instance, corrupt partners 
oftentimes integrate vertically to form a new company with common ownership and control; 
or firms hand out put or call options as bribes instead of direct monetary payments in order to 
ensure compliance, (Lambsdorff 2002). In many cases social ties and cohesion between 
corrupt actors play an important role for enforcement as well, (Kingston 2007). And in 
rougher environments opportunism by either party may be cut off by threats to life or 
physical condition, backed, for instance, by organized crime groups, (della Porta and Vanucci 
1999: 232-236; Gambetta 1993). 
Another fundamental feature of corruption is that those involved automatically end up having 
information on each others’ misdemeanor such as on the initiation of the corrupt deal, its 
design, the payment schemes and where the money or the valuables can be found, (Spagnolo 
2006: 4). Therefore, if a deal turns sour or runs the risk of being detected, each party has to 
fear that its counterpart will reveal these pieces of information to the prosecuting authorities 
in exchange for a mitigated punishment. 
For example, the largest company in France, Elf Aquitaine, allegedly set up an internal 
financial network aimed at providing funding for corrupt political purposes. This so-called 
“Investment Board” consisted of relatives and friends of the chairman of the board. This 
institution was well established, and succeeded for a while. Yet the booting out of one 
member put an end to its operation. The outcast took revenge, and reported operations of the 
network. Clearly, some type of conflict can stimulate one party to take revenge, or to prefer 
honesty to involvement in illegal transactions, (Lambsdorff and Nell 2007). 
Voluntary disclosure programs can be designed such as to exploit these Achilles heels of 
corruption. In particular, if leniency is granted to those who self-report only at a certain stage 
of a corrupt deal, the trust in mutual compliance and silence among corrupt partners can be 
severely shattered. Moreover, if voluntary disclosure programs require testimony to be 
provided against accomplices, their power is further strengthened. 
2  Strategic Aspects of Voluntary Disclosure Programs – Benchmark Case Turkey 
The Turkish Penal Code well serves as a benchmark for illustrating the strategic aspects of 
voluntary disclosure programs. Active and passive bribery are criminalized pursuant to 
Article 252. Subsections (1) and (3) are of relevance
4: 
(1) Any public officer who receives a bribe shall be sentenced to a penalty of 
imprisonment for a term of four years to twelve years. The person giving 
the bribe shall be sentenced as if he were a public officer. Where the 
parties agree upon a bribe, they shall be sentenced as if the offence were 
completed. […] 
(3) A bribe is defined as the securing of a benefit by a public officer by his 
agreeing with another to perform, or not to perform, a task in breach of the 
requirements of his duty. 
                                                 
4 Translations in this section were provided by Dr. Vahit Biçak, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Security 
Sciences at the Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey. […] indicates omissions.  
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The offence of bribery is completed at the time a public official receives or agrees to receive 
a bribe. For Article 252 (1) to take effect, there is no need of the public official actually to 
perform the task demanded by the bribe-giver. Accordingly, a bribe-giver is punished at the 
time he gives or offers a bribe. It is again not a prerequisite that the public official thereupon 
performs the demanded task. The corresponding voluntary disclosure programs are codified 
in Article 254 (1) and (2): 
(1) Where, prior to the commencement of investigation, the person in receipt 
of the bribe presents […] such, in its original state, to the authorities, no 
penalty shall be imposed for the offence of bribery. Where, prior to the 
commencement of an investigation, a public officer who, after having 
agreed to receive a bribe, informs the authorities of such, no penalty shall 
be imposed. 
(2) Where, prior to the commencement of investigation, a person who offered 
and gave a bribe to a public officer informs the authorities responsible for 
investigation of such, no penalty shall be imposed and the bribe he gave to 
the public officer shall be taken from the public officer and handed back to 
him. 
Article 254 is an example of a voluntary disclosure program. It requires self-reporting prior 
to detection and investigation. Moreover, it is codified, automatic and public. Anyone who 
commits a crime pursuant to Article 252, but fulfils Article 254’s requirements, is granted 
leniency to the extent formulated in Article 254. However, the voluntary disclosure program 
contains several strategic weaknesses that may impede its effectiveness in curbing 
corruption. 
Weakness 1: Supplying a bribe-giver with a credible threat against opportunism 
According to Article 254 (2) no punishment is imposed on a bribe-giver if he notifies the 
authorities before the commencement of investigation. Such an exit option is important for 
extracting information indispensable for detection, investigation, prosecution and conviction. 
Moreover, it is important for preventing a bribe-giver from becoming entrapped in his 
criminal career. However, leniency must be granted in a strategic way so as not to run the 
risk of assisting corrupt actors with enforcing their illicit deals. To illustrate this, let us 
consider the following exemplary case (Figure 1). 
The government invites tenders for a contract involving the construction of several apartment 
buildings. The public official (E) is commissioned by the government to solicit and evaluate 
the bids. The private firm is one of the bidders. Its director (D) is in charge of preparing the 
bid. In the course of the bidding process D gives E a bribe and expects E to award the 
contract. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, D can be cheated by E insofar as E does not award the contract after 
having received the bribe from D. The risk of such acts of double-dealing on part of E is a 
good thing because it makes corruption a troublesome business for D, (Lambsdorff and Nell 
2007). For example, if Karlheinz Schreiber had known that Brian Mulroney did not intend to 
wield his power for promoting both the Thyssen factory and his own pasta business, he 
would most likely not have paid the CAD 300,000 in the first place.  
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Figure 1 
However, Article 254 (2) supplies D with a ‘weapon’ against potential opportunism. Since 
exemption from punishment is granted to D at any stage of a corrupt deal as long as he self-
reports before the commencement of investigation, he can force E into awarding the contract 
by threatening to make a report. The threat is credible because Article 252 (1) punishes E 
once he has agreed to accept or accepted the bribe. The penalty is imposed irrespective of 
him returning the favor. Hence, if D makes a report, E has to reckon with being subjected to 
criminal sanctions, while D goes unpunished. By conceding leniency to D at any stage of a 
corrupt deal, Article 254 (2) thus supplies D with a credible threat that he can misuse for 
seeing to it that E awards the contract after having taken the bribe. 
To eliminate this credible threat, leniency should only be granted to D on condition that he 
self-reports after E reciprocated the bribe. Besides stripping D of a powerful enforcement 
mechanism, the voluntary disclosure program would then be designed in a strategic way that 
undermines both players’ trustworthiness. D could no longer credibly promise that he will 
not report the deal once the bribe (or the offer of such) has been reciprocated by E. 
Reckoning with the possibility of being reported if he reciprocates, E would in turn abstain 
from returning the bribe favor (or the offer of such). The strategic design thus has a dual 
effect that destabilizes corrupt deals and relationships and may ultimately lead to the entire 
deal’s collapse at the stage of initiation.
5 
Let us look at this against the background of the Mulroney-Schreiber affair and let us assume 
for a moment that Turkish legislation applies. Schreiber paid CAD 300,000 to Mulroney and 
expected him to help establish a factory for light-armored vehicles in Quebec operated by 
Thyssen AG. Moreover, Schreiber wanted Mulroney to promote his private pasta business. 
But Mulroney allegedly did nothing of the sort. Schreiber could have abused Article 254 (2) 
to pressure Mulroney into fulfilling his part of the deal. This is because Schreiber would have 
                                                 
5 See Lambsdorff and Nell (2007) for a formal derivation of this result. 
Public Official     
(E) 
Government Private  Firm 
gives bribe for award of contract 
Director          
(D) 
does not award the contract 
threatens with reporting 
Article 254 (2)  
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gone unpunished while Mulroney would have faced criminal proceedings pursuant to Article 
252 (1). To avoid such abuses of a voluntary disclosure program, leniency should only be 
granted if Schreiber reported his wrongdoing after Mulroney pulled his strings on Schreiber’s 
behalf. 
Consistent with this logic, Article 254 (2) should be reformulated as follows (changes 
highlighted in italics): 
(2) Where, prior to the commencement of an investigation, a person who 
offered and gave a bribe to a public officer informs the authorities 
responsible for investigation of such, but only after the public officer 
performed the task in the interest of such person, no penalty shall be 
imposed […].
6 
Weakness 2: Supplying a bribe-taker with a credible threat against opportunism 
Article 254 (1) grants exemption from punishment at any stage of a corrupt deal as long as E 
self-reports before investigations have been initiated. E thus has the opportunity to report the 
deal also after its finalization, i.e. after having reciprocated on the bribe (or on the offer of 
such). This incentive should clearly be upheld because it produces uncertainty on part of D 
about not being turned in by E even if the deal has gone through smoothly. Moreover, it 
gives E the opportunity to escape from a vicious circle of being pressured by D into corrupt 
deals again and again. Mulroney could have reported the deal with Schreiber even if he had 
already pulled his political and business strings to promote the Thyssen factory and 
Schreiber’s pasta business. On this account, the formulation of Article 254 (1), sentence one, 
requires no change. 
However, as Figure 2 illustrates, E may also award the contract before actually being paid the 
bribe. D can now behave opportunistically insofar as not to pay the promised bribe. Article 
254 (1), sentence two, equips E with a ‘weapon’ against such an act of opportunism, though. 
He can threaten D with reporting the deal and thus ensure D’s compliance. 
The threat is credible because E is exempted from punishment in case of self-reporting. 
Moreover, the offering or promising of a bribe already is a punishable act according to 
adjudication pertaining to Article 252 (2). Hence, D has to reckon with being subjected to 
punishment, while E goes unpunished. 
To strip E of such a credible threat, the voluntary disclosure program should codify that 
exemption from punishment is granted to E only if the bribe was actually given to him.
7 The 
formulation in Article 254 (1), sentence two, however, runs counter to this. The well-
intended Turkish leniency program may thus be abused by E to put pressure on D to be paid 
the bribe. 
                                                 
6 It is noteworthy that according to Article 254 (2) the bribe is returned to the bribe-giver in case of self-
reporting: “…and the bribe he gave to the public officer shall be taken from the public officer and handed back 
to him”. This creates an even stronger incentive for a bribe-giver to report a corrupt deal and further undermines 
his trustworthiness. However, while a bribe-giver who shows signs of sincere repentance should be granted 
leniency, he should not be able to seek the law’s protection by reclaiming his expenses. Returning the bribe can 
clearly not be supported. Thus, Turkish legislators should consider eliminating this rider. 
7 See Lambsdorff and Nell (2007) for a formal derivation of this result.  
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Figure 2 
Let us again look at this in face of the Mulroney-Schreiber affair. But let us now assume that 
Schreiber promised to pay CAD 300,000 once Mulroney successfully wielded his influence 
to promote the Thyssen factory and his past business. Schreiber could have then cheated 
Mulroney by failing to make the payment as agreed. Assuming anew that Turkish legislation 
applies, Mulroney could have misused Article 254 (1) to force Schreiber to pay. Since 
Schreiber had been on Canadian and German prosecutors’ radar for a long time, Schreiber 
would have likely complied and pay the agreed sum. 
On this account, a strategic design would have to encompass the elimination of sentence two 
of Article 254 (1). 
(1) Where, prior to the commencement of an investigation, the person in 
receipt of the bribe presents […] such, in its original state, to the 
authorities, no penalty shall be imposed for the offence of bribery. Where, 
prior to the commencement of investigation, a public officer who, after 
having agreed to receive a bribe, informs the authorities of such, no 
penalty shall be imposed. 
The voluntary disclosure programs then interact such as to shatter the mutual trust in 
reciprocity. E has to reckon with being cheated by D and will thus in most instances demand 
the bribe prior to the award of the contract. D then faces the risk that E does not award the 
contract, though. Since D is granted leniency only in case E reciprocated, D cannot make 
sure that E complies as he lacks a credible threat. Moreover, even if E awards the contract, he 
may self-report at a later stage to avoid punishment. In the end, the circular effects of the 
voluntary disclosure programs strip both D and E of the trust in reciprocity necessary for 
striking a corrupt deal.
8 
                                                 
8 See Lambsdorff and Frank (2007) for an experimental validation of the results. 
Public Official     
(E) 
Government Private  Firm 
awards the contract 
does not pay the bribe 
threatens with reporting 
Article 254 (1) 
Director          
(D)  
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3  Policy Recommendations 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in Article 15 (a) and (b) puts 
forth recommendations on the criminalization of active and passive bribery.
9 Moreover, 
Article 37 provides for a guideline for leniency provisions to be considered by signatory and 
ratifying parties.
10 Against these Articles’ background I propose the following voluntary 
disclosure programs. 
Active Bribery 
(1) A person offering, promising or giving, directly or indirectly, an undue 
advantage to a public official, for the official himself or herself or another 
person or entity, in order that the official, in the exercise of his or her official 
duties, act on behalf of the giver of an advantage or another person or entity 
shall be punished with […]. 
Voluntary Disclosure Program for Active Bribery 
(2) A person liable pursuant to (1) shall be exempted from punishment if he or 
she reports to the competent authorities before preliminary proceedings have 
been taken, if the public official acted on behalf of him or her or another 




(1’) A public official, who, directly or indirectly, solicits, agrees to accept or 
accepts an undue advantage, for himself or herself or another person or entity, 
                                                 
9 Article 15: Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish 
as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in 
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation 
or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or 
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or 
her official duties. See UNODC (2003: 11) 
10 Article 37: 1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate or who 
have participated in the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention to supply 
information useful to competent authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide factual, 
specific help to competent authorities that may contribute to depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime and to 
recovering such proceeds. 2. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in appropriate cases, 
of mitigating punishment of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or 
prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention. 3. Each State Party shall consider 
providing for the possibility, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, of granting 
immunity from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution 
of an offence established in accordance with this Convention. 4. Protection of such persons shall be, mutatis 
mutandis, as provided for in article 32 of this Convention. 5. Where a person referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
article located in one State Party can provide substantial cooperation to the competent authorities of another 
State Party, the States Parties concerned may consider entering into agreements or arrangements, in accordance 
with their domestic law, concerning the potential provision by the other State Party of the treatment set forth in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article. See UNODC (2003: 19). 
11 Conditioning leniency on actual conviction of the public official would push things too far because 
prosecutors my fail in achieving it due to random errors or political constraints. However, making testimony a 
condition for leniency is important to strengthen the risks that self-reporting entail.  
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in order that he or she, in the exercise of his or her official duties, act on 
behalf of the giver of an advantage or another person or entity shall be 
punished with […]. 
Voluntary Disclosure Program for Passive Bribery 
(2’) A person liable pursuant to (1’) shall be exempted from punishment if he 
or she reports to the competent authorities before preliminary proceedings 
have been taken, if the undue advantage was given to him or her, and if he or 
she provides testimony against the giver of the undue advantage.
12 
Table 1 summarizes the key elements. 
Form of Bribery  Elements of Strategic Voluntary Disclosure Programs 
Active Bribery  Leniency is granted only if the 
bribe was reciprocated 
Passive Bribery 
Leniency is granted only if the 
bribe was given and not if the 
bribe was only promised 
- Leniency is granted in case of 
self-reporting 
- Self-reporting is required to 
encompass testimony 
Table 1 
It remains questionable whether the solicitation of a bribe should really be exempt from 
punishment in case of self-reporting. If E solicited the bribe through coercion or intimidation 
or the threatening with physical harm, I believe that he should not be exempt from 
punishment. E’s self-reporting should then at most be seen as a reason for mitigating his 
applicable sentence. However, the decision about this should be that of prosecutors and 
judges as they should be able to weigh the gravity of E’s offence against eventual mitigating 
circumstances such as active repentance. 
In less severe instances of solicitation, however, conceding leniency automatically may be 
reasonable. A reliable backdoor is necessary because otherwise D can in the future turn the 
tables on E and demand the supply of corrupt services. Without the possibility of being 
granted leniency in case of self-reporting, E would be entrapped in a long-lasting criminal 
career. What develops is a vicious circle of mutual dependencies that fosters corruption. 
Accordingly, the voluntary disclosure program for active bribery also encompasses cases in 
which the bribe was solicited. Its formulation implies that D is exempted from punishment 
only if he reports after E awarded the contract. This may seem strange at first view. 
However, if leniency is granted at an earlier stage, D is equipped with a credible threat 
against E who solicits a bribe but does not deliver thereupon. 
                                                 
12 Again, conditioning leniency on actual conviction of the bribe-giver would push things too far because 
prosecutors may fail in achieving it due to random errors or political constraints.  
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In fact, E can continue soliciting bribes from D as long as he does award the contract. He can 
do so because D cannot escape from this trap as he is only conceded leniency if E awarded 
the contract. Besides, if E can expect leniency if he self-reports, he can credibly threaten D 
with reporting unless D does not continue giving bribes. Anticipating this two-sided 
opportunistic behavior (non-reciprocity and ongoing solicitation), D would likely abstain 
from ceding to E’s demands in the first place. 
4  Cross-Section Analysis 
This section analyzes the relevant provisions in the penal codes of 56 countries. In 2006, 181 
criminal law scholars and anti-corruption practitioners from 100 countries were contacted via 
e-Mail. The experts were identified by means of Internet research (law faculties of 
universities and members of bar associations) as well with the aid of the German 
Development Agency (GTZ) and the International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association 
(ICDAA). 
The experts were described the research project and asked to support it by providing an “up-
to-date and official version” of their home country’s penal code in English, or in French or 
Spanish where these are official languages. Of the 181 people contacted 68 replied. 37 
provided an English version of their home country’s penal code. The remaining 31 experts 
replied that they were not aware of an English translation of their country’s penal code. No 
one provided either a French or Spanish version. Therefore, further research was conducted 
at the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (Freiburg, Germany) 
in December 2006. The Institute’s database of approximately 100 penal codes was searched 
for penal codes available in French or Spanish. 31 penal codes fulfilled the language 
criterion. However, due to time constraints 15 of the 31 penal codes were randomly selected 
and translated from French and Spanish into English and entered the study. 3 penal codes 
were available in English at the Institute and therefore also entered the study. One further 
penal code was available in English on the Internet. 
The countries included in the cross-section analysis are (in alphabetical order): Albania, 
Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, 
Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan.
13 
In the course of the penal codes’ analysis it was assessed whether or not active and/or passive 
bribery are criminal offences (explicit criminalization). If so it was further analyzed whether 
or not voluntary disclosure programs for these offences exist (codified leniency). 
Accordingly, a provision was counted as a voluntary disclosure program if it requires self-
reporting prior to detection/investigation and if it explicitly relates to active or passive 
bribery. Thus, leniency provisions that are part of codes of criminal procedure were not 
counted as they usually do not explicitly relate to active or passive bribery. For the same 
                                                 
13 Appendix II lists the sections in the respective penal codes. The paragraphs’ wording is included in Appendix 
III, available online at (http://www.icgg.org/downloads/Appendix%20III%20Penal%20Codes.pdf).  
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reason, provisions in the penal codes’ general parts, listing circumstances mitigating liability 
and punishment, were not counted either. 
Even though the exact elements and the degree and type of penalties of the offenses vary, 
both active and passive bribery are criminalized in all 56 countries (Figure 3). There is no 
country in the sample criminalizing only active or passive bribery. These results may be 
subject to a sample selection problem. Some experts may have not provided a penal code if 
bribery is not criminalized in their respective country. Moreover, some experts may have 
been averse to providing a penal code if they felt that criminalization of active and passive 
bribery in their country is insufficient. However, this sample selection problem is to some 












Explicit Criminalization 56 56
Codified Leniency 26 3
Active Bribery Passive Bribery
 
Figure 3 
26 of the 56 countries (46%) employ voluntary disclosure programs for active or passive 
bribery. All of these 26 do so for active bribery. In stark contrast, voluntary disclosure 
programs for passive bribery exist in only 3 of the 26 countries (18%). This indicates that, if 
voluntary disclosure programs are employed, they apply mostly to active bribery. Explicitly 
granting leniency also in cases of self-reporting acts of passive bribery is clearly the 
exception rather than the rule. However, such an asymmetry may produce negative effects by 
entrapping public officials in a corrupt career, and if improperly designed, by supplying 
bribe-givers with a means to enforce corrupt deals. 
A potential explanation for this asymmetry, namely that a bribe is oftentimes solicited or 
extorted and that in these cases leniency ought to be conceded to a bribe-giver, is not strongly 
supported by the cross-section analysis. Just 7 of the 26 countries grant leniency only in case 
of solicitation or extortion. All others concede leniency also if a bribe was offered, promised 
or given on the bribers own accord (see next subsection). 
The statistics concerning the voluntary disclosure programs are representative. The experts 
were told that “the research project involves the analysis of elements of bribery offences”. 
However, they were not told that the analysis would primarily focus on the existence and the 
design of voluntary disclosure programs pertaining to these offences. Therefore, it can be 
largely excluded that any expert provided a penal code only if voluntary disclosure programs  
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exist in it. A sample selection problem seems not to influence the conclusion that voluntary 
disclosure programs are applied asymmetrically. 
Voluntary Disclosure Programs for Active Bribery 
The countries employing voluntary disclosure programs for active bribery are Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Romania, 
Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan.
14 
The voluntary disclosure programs of these countries can be divided into three types. The 
first type grants leniency to a bribe-giver only if he reports and the bribe was solicited or 
extorted from him (VDP I). Voluntary disclosure does not result in leniency if he offered, 
promised or gave the bribe on his own accord. This type of a voluntary disclosure program 
can be found in 7 of the 26 countries (27%): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Tajikistan. This is a clear deficiency since self-
reporting should result in leniency also in case a bribe was offered, promised or given 
without request in order to promote voluntary disclosure and to destabilize corrupt deals. 
The second type concedes leniency if a bribe-giver reports the offering, promising or giving 
of a bribe or if the bribe was solicited or extorted from him. In case of extortion self-
reporting is not necessary (VDP II). This type of a voluntary disclosure program is present in 
3 of the 26 countries (12%): Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Bulgaria. This is again a deficient 
design since a bribe-giver need not come out in the open. He could always claim that the 
bribe was solicited or extorted from him if detected randomly even if he in fact was the 
‘active’ part. In many instances it will be difficult for prosecution to prove the contrary. Self-
reporting should thus clearly be required also in case of solicitation or extortion in order to 
distinguish the victims from the culprits.
15 
The third type concedes leniency in all instances if a bribe-giver reports. Reporting is also 
required if the bribe was solicited or extorted from the bribe-giver (VDP III). This type of a 
voluntary disclosure program can be found in 16 countries (61%): China, Hungary, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. This type of a voluntary disclosure program is 
clearly preferred to the above types because self-reporting is necessary in all instances of 
active bribery and also in case of solicitation or extortion. Corrections are necessary in China 
and Montenegro, though. There, leniency is not granted automatically but is at the discretion 
of judges. 
What becomes obvious, however, is that none of the countries employs a voluntary 
disclosure program that takes into consideration the unique nature of corrupt deals. All 
countries grant leniency at any stage of a corrupt deal. As pointed out in Section 2, such 
voluntary disclosure programs run the risk of being abused by corrupt crooks to enforce their 
                                                 
14 The Chinese and the Montenegrin penal codes state that the perpetrators can be acquitted from punishment, 
i.e. exemption from punishment is not definite, leading to counterproductive legal uncertainty on behalf of 
potential whistle-blowers. 
15 Exceptions can be made in case a bribe-giver had to fear for his well-being because he was threatened with 
physical harm if he should report.  
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deals. To counter this, leniency should only be granted if the bribe was reciprocated. No 
country does so, though.
16 
Another interesting aspect is illustrated in Table 2. In 18 of the 26 countries (69%) that have 
a voluntary disclosure program for active bribery the bribe is not returned to the bribe-giver 
if he self-reports. In 3 countries (12%) the bribe may be returned and in 5 countries (19%) the 
bribe is returned to the bribe-giver if he reports. 
Type of VDP 
Bribe 
VDP I 
(no. of countries) 
VDP II 
(no. of countries) 
VDP III 
(no. of countries) 
∑ (% of total) 
Bribe is not returned  3  3  12  18 (69%) 
Bribe may be returned  1  0  2  3 (12%) 
Bribe is returned  3  0  2  5 (19%) 
∑ (% of total)  7 (27%)  3 (12%)  16 (61%)  26 (100%) 
Table 2 
In a voluntary disclosure program necessitating that the bribe was solicited or extorted for 
leniency to be conceded (VDP I) the bribe is returned in 3 countries, may be returned in 1 
country and is not returned in 3 countries. In a voluntary disclosure program of the second 
type (VDP II) the bribe is never returned. Neither if the briber offered, promised or gave a 
bribe on his own accord nor if the bribe was solicited or extorted from him. In a voluntary 
disclosure program of the third type (VDP III), which necessitates self-reporting in any case, 
the majority of the countries do not return the bribe. Only in 4 countries the bribe is or may 
be returned. 
Whether or not the bribe should be returned to a briber is a controversial issue, (Lamsdorff 
and Nell 2007: 13). On the one hand, returning the bribe to the giver would most likely be at 
odds with the public’s notion of justice and fairness. Those who tried to exercise influence by 
illicit means and to annul fair competition should not be financially rewarded even if they 
show signs of sincere and active repentance through self-reporting. In fact, that this stance 
prevails is supported by the fact that in the majority of countries the bribe is not returned 
even in case of voluntary disclosure. However, from a strategic perspective one would have 
to take another position. If a briber were given back the bribe, his incentive to report would 
increase and corrupt arrangements would further be destabilized. The public’s sentiments 
may thus not be the suitable guide for the design of anti-corruption legislation. 
 
                                                 
16 Table I.1 in Appendix I lists the respective elements country by country.  
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Voluntary Disclosure Programs for Passive Bribery 
Voluntary disclosure programs for passive bribery exist in Hungary, Senegal and Turkey. In 
all three countries leniency is granted if a public official solicits or extorts, agrees to accept 
or accepts a bribe.
 17 This is to be supported because a public official can thus escape the trap 
of a long-lasting criminal career. However, from the perspective of destabilizing corrupt 
deals leniency should only be conceded to a public official if the bribe was actually given to 
him. Such a strategic destabilization element is missing in all three countries. 
The bribe is confiscated in case of reporting by the public official. The rationale behind this 
is that the “state is considered a victim of corruption because the moneys taken by a corrupt 
public official legally belong to the state. The bribes taken are held, technically, in trust for 
the state. Therefore, the state can sue the official for the full amount of the value of the bribes 
he or she has received […]”, (Pope 2000: 276). From the perspective of destabilizing corrupt 
arrangements, however, it would strengthen a public official’s willingness to cheat if he 
could keep the bribe, (Lambsdorff and Nell 2007). Investigation of this issue is an avenue for 
future research. 
5  Conclusion 
Even though high penalties for corruption offences have a deterrent and preventive effect, 
they also entrap bribe-takers and bribe-givers in their corrupt relationship. Moreover, 
pending penalties can be misused to make threats against opportunistic behavior and can thus 
stabilize risky bribe agreements. Voluntary disclosure programs can be strategically applied 
to break the ‘pact of silence’ and to promote opportunism in a targeted way. 
The proposed voluntary disclosure programs for acts of active and passive bribery bear the 
potential to destabilize corrupt deals and to lead to their collapse at the stage of initiation. 
This particularly holds for one-shot, large-scale transactions where corrupt actors have not 
established good formal and informal ties beforehand. Then the risk of opportunism and 
exposure is especially high. Strategic voluntary disclosure programs can increase both risks. 
In contrast, the suggested programs may not unfold their effects when it comes to corrupt 
transactions where there is long-lasting and repeated formal and informal exchange between 
the corrupt actors. 
As the cross-section analysis shows, voluntary disclosure programs are not universally 
applied. And if so, they mostly relate to active bribery. Granting leniency also for acts of 
passive bribery is clearly the exception rather than the rule. Such an asymmetry may produce 
the negative effect of entrapping public officials in corrupt relationships. Moreover, strategic 
considerations have thus far not entered the design of voluntary disclosure programs. 
Consequently, corrupt actors may in many instances abuse existing voluntary disclosure 
programs for their malicious purposes. 
Several important questions for future research remain. Labor legislation would in most 
instances stipulate a disciplinary transfer or dismissal of the person revealing his involvement 
in a corrupt deal, (Ax and Schneider 2006: 101-129). Thus, self-reporting is inhibited. 
Moreover, the pending risk of a transfer or dismissal can again be abused by a corrupt actor 
to pressure his counterpart into compliance. This especially holds for public officials who 
                                                 
17 Table I.2 in Appendix I lists the respective elements country by country.  
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oftentimes do not have an outside option to their work in public administration. Therefore, it 
stands to reason that labor legislation should take into consideration some of the strategic 
issues discussed here. In particular, those who voluntarily disclose their offence at a certain 
point in time may be exempted not only from criminal proceedings but also from labor law 
consequences such as disciplinary transfers or dismissals. 
Similarly, contracts obtained by means of bribery are oftentimes void or voidable, (Berg 
2004, Schlüter 2005, Ax and Schneider 2006). Again, nullity and voidability inhibit 
voluntary disclosure because “the bribing party does not only lose its bribe, but also the 
economic advantage, the induced contract, that has been the motive for corruption”, (Schlüter 
2005: 233). Moreover, nullity and voidability can be abused to apply pressure on non-
conforming corrupt actors, (Nell 2007). Against both backgrounds one can argue that 
contracts induced by bribery should be severable or valid, (Nell 2007). 
Similar adverse effects may surround debarment (exclusion) as an administrative remedy 
available to a government that prevents or disqualifies contractors from obtaining new 
contracts. Voluntary disclosure as a sign of active repentance should be considered a 
mitigating circumstance limiting or eliminating debarment.  
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Appendix I: Incorporation of Elements of Strategic Voluntary Disclosure Programs 
Active Bribery 
Country  Leniency is granted in 
case of self-reporting 
Self-reporting is required 
to encompass testimony 
Leniency is granted only 
if the bribe was 
reciprocated 
Armenia*
  Yes, or if the bribe was 
extorted
18  No No 
Azerbaijan*
  Yes, or if the bribe was 
extorted  No No 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
‡  Yes, but only if the bribe 
was extorted  No No 
Bulgaria*
  Yes, or if the bribe was 
extorted  No No 
China* 
∆  Yes No No 
Croatia
†  Yes, but only if the bribe 
was extorted  No No 
Czech Republic*
  Yes, but only if the bribe 
was extorted  No No 
Hungary* Yes  Yes  No 
Iraq* Yes  No  No 
Kazakhstan* Yes  No  No 
Latvia* Yes  No  No 
Macedonia
†  Yes, but only if the bribe 
was extorted  No No 
                                                 
18 See comments at the end of the table.  
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Moldova* Yes  No  No 
Mongolia* Yes  No  No 
Montenegro
‡ ∆  Yes No No 
Romania
†  Yes No No 
Russia* Yes  No  No 
Senegal* Yes  Yes  No 
Serbia
‡  Yes No No 
Slovakia*  Yes, but only if the bribe 
was extorted  No No 
Slovenia
‡  Yes, but only if the bribe 
was extorted  No No 
Tajikistan*  Yes, but only if the bribe 
was extorted  No No 
Tunisia* Yes  No  No 
Turkey
†  Yes No No 
Ukraine* Yes  No  No 
Uzbekistan* Yes  Yes  No 
COMMENTS ON THE NEXT PAGE  
      III
Comments: 
 “Yes”: Leniency is granted to a bribe-giver if he reports. Reporting is required also if the bribe was extorted 
from him. 
“Yes, or if the bribe was extorted”: Leniency is granted to a bribe-giver if he reports the offering, promising or 
giving of a bribe or if the bribe was solicited or extorted from him. In case of extortion self-reporting is not 
necessary. 
“Yes, but only if the bribe was extorted”: Leniency is granted to a bribe-giver only if he reports and the bribe 
was solicited or extorted from him. No leniency if he offered, promised or gave the bribe on his own accord. 
* bribe is not returned to the giver 
† bribe is returned to the giver 
‡ bribe may be returned to the giver 




Country  Leniency is granted in 
case of self-reporting 
Self-reporting is required 
to encompass testimony 
Leniency is granted only 
if the bribe was given 
and not if the bribe was 
only promised 
Hungary* Yes  Yes  No 
Senegal* Yes  Yes  No 
Turkey* Yes  No  No 
Comments: 
“Yes”: Leniency is granted if the bribe-taker solicits or extorts, agrees to accept or accepts a bribe. 
* bribe is confiscated 
Table I.2  
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Appendix II: List of Provisions in Penal Codes 
Form  Active Bribery  Passive Bribery 
Country  Liability  Leniency Program  Liability  Leniency Program 
Albania  244, 245  -  259, 260  - 
Algeria 129  -  126-128  - 
Argentina  258, 259  -  256, 259  - 
Armenia  312, 313, 350  312 (4)  311  - 
Australia  82, 99  -  82, 99  - 
Austria 307  -  304  - 
Azerbaijan 312  312  (Note)  311  - 
Bolivia 158  -  145  - 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
218 218  (3) 217  - 
Bulgaria  304, 304a.  306  301, 304a.(3), 307  - 
Burkina Faso  158, 160  -  158, 159  - 
Burundi 303  -  300,  301,  302  - 
Canada  119-121, 123 (1)  -  119-121, 123 (1), 
125 
- 
Chile  250, 250bis.  -  248, 248bis., 249  - 
China  389, 390, 392  390, 392  385, 386,  - 
Colombia 407  -  405,  406  -  
      V
Costa Rica  343  -  338-341  - 
Croatia 348  348  (3)  347  - 
Czech Republic  161, 162(2)  163  160  - 
Estonia  297, 298  -  293, 294  - 
Ethiopia 437  -  423,  425  - 
Finland  Chapter 13: 13, 14  -  Chapter 40: 1, 2, 3  - 
Germany
19  333, 334, 335, 336  -  331, 332, 335, 336  - 
Honduras 366  -  361-365  - 
Hungary  253  255/A (2)  250  255/A (1) 
Iceland 109  -  128  - 
India 171  -  171  - 
Iraq  310, 313  311  307, 308, 309  - 
Japan 198  -  197,  197-3  - 
Kazakhstan 312  312 (Notes)  311  - 
Kuwait  115, 117  -  114, 118, 119  - 
Latvia 323  324  (1),  (2)  320  - 
                                                 
19  In Germany leniency is only granted if the benefit was previously authorized or is authorized by the 
competent public authority upon reporting. Consequently, self-reporting without the proof of prior authorization 
would not result in exemption from punishment. Therefore, §§ 331 (3) and 333 (3) are not counted as voluntary 
disclosure programs.  
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Macedonia 358  358  (3)  357  - 
Malta 120  -  115  - 
Mexico  222 (2)  -  222 (1)  - 
Moldova 325  325  (4)  324  - 
Mongolia 269  269  (Note)  268  - 
Montenegro 424  424  (4)  423 - 
Nicaragua 427  -  421,  422,  423  - 
Nigeria  521 (2)  -  521 (1), 523, 525  - 
Panama 162  -  160,  161  - 
Peru 399  -  393,  394  - 
Philippines 212 -  210,  211  - 
Romania  309  309 (4), (5)  308, 310  - 
Russia 291  291  (Note)  290  - 
Senegal 161  160  159,  160  160 
Serbia 368  368  (4)  367  - 
Slovakia 161  163  160  - 
Slovenia  268, 269  268 (3), 269a (3)  267  - 
Sweden  Chapter 17, Section 
7 
- Chapter  20, 
Section 2 
- 
Tajikistan 320  320  (Note)  319  -  
      VII
Tunisia  91, 92  93  83-85, 88  - 
Turkey  252  254 (2)  252  254 (1) 
Ukraine  369 369  (3)  368,  370 - 
Uruguay 159  -  157,  158  - 
Uzbekistan 211  211  210  - 
Table II.1  
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